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Abstract—This work tackles the problem of energy-efficient
distributed power control in wireless networks with a large num-
ber of transmitters. The problem is modeled by a dynamic game.
Each transmitter-receiver communication is characterized by a
state given by the available energy and/or the individual channel
state and whose evolution is governed by certain dynamics. Since
equilibrium analysis in such a (stochastic) game is generally
difficult and even impossible, the problem is approximated by
exploiting the large system assumption. Under an appropriate
exchangeability assumption, the corresponding mean field game
is well defined and studied in detail for special cases. The
main contribution of this work is to show how mean field
games can be applied to the problem under investigation and
provide illustrative numerical results. Our results indicate that
this approach can lead to significant gains in terms of energy-
efficiency at the resulting equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study distributed wireless networks, in which mobile
terminals have the liberty to choose their own power policies.
This can be due to the absence of a central node to control
the terminals in the network or due to complexity issues when
there is a large number of terminals. Such a scenario can
occur with ad hoc networks [7], unlicensed band communi-
cations, and cognitive radio [5], [15]. Modeling the terminals
as rational agents, who choose their power control policies
to maximize some utilities leads to applying game theory
on the problem [8], [10]. In the problem under study, the
wireless network model is a multiple access channel (MAC)
and the channel access method is code division multiple
access (CDMA). In this network, the mobile terminals aim
to maximize their expected energy-efficiencies over a given
time duration. For this purpose, they must adapt their power
control policies to varying channel conditions and decreasing
energy in their batteries.
By energy-efficiency, we mean the number of successfully
decoded bits at the receiver per Joule consumed at the trans-
mitter, as defined in [6]. In this seminal paper and related
works [14], [3], [9], [4], [1], the power control problem is
modeled by a sequence of static games independent from
one stage to another. But this approach does not capture the
interactions that are present among the players when a game
is repeated. In [12], it is shown that modeling the problem
by a repeated game can lead to more efficient equilibrium
power control policies (in the sense of Pareto) than the
Nash equilibrium from the static formulation. However, this
repeated model uses a normalized stage game which does not
depend on the channels realizations. One of the motivations
of our work is to account for the impact of channels real-
izations by modeling the problem with a stochastic game.
Moreover, we also account for long-term energy constraint
in the terminal since the remaining energy of the battery
decreases when power is consumed. Precisely, the energy-
efficient power control problem in MAC under long-term
energy constraints is modeled by a stochastic differential game
(SDG). But the problem of characterizing the performance
of distributed networks modeled by SDG becomes hard and
even impossible when the number of players becomes large.
The same statement holds for determining individually optimal
control strategies. In [13], this problem is overcome by the use
of mean field games (MFG). MFG [11] represent a way of
approximating a stochastic differential (or difference) game,
by a much more tractable model. Under the assumption of
individual state information, the idea is precisely to exploit as
an opportunity the fact that the number of players is large to
simplify the analysis. Typically, instead of depending on the
actions and states of all the players, the mean field utility of a
player only depends on his own action and state, and depends
on the others through an mean field. The main contribution
of this paper is to show that the model developed in [13]
can be particularized to cases in which, it is possible to
derive equilibrium power control policies. These policies are
illustrated with some numerical results and they are compared
with the equilibrium from the static game formulation and the
equilibrium of the repeated discounted game studied in [12].
Our paper is structured as follows. We describe the studied
wireless network and the evolution laws for the channels and
the energy in Sec. II. In Sec. III, the problem of power
control is modeled as an SDG and is shown to converge to
an MFG under given conditions. Additionally, the regime of
large energy budgets and the regime of quasi-static channels
are discussed. Resulting equilibrium power control strategies
are compared to the classical power control policies from the
static game and the discounted repeated game in Sec. IV.
Notations: In the following, ∇xf and ∆xf respectively
represent the gradient and the Laplacian of the function f
w.r.t. the vector x. The divergence operator w.r.t. the vector
x is denoted by divx. The scalar product in the space A is
represented by 〈 , 〉A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider one cell with a single base station and K
mobile terminals. Since the uplink power control problem
is addressed, mobile terminals are transmitters and the base
station is the receiver. The radio resource is used as a MAC.
Consequently the transmitters interfere with each other. Each
transmitter sends a signal to a common receiver and has to
choose the power level of the transmitted signal. In order to
optimize its individual energy-efficiency, i.e., the ratio of its
throughput to its transmit power, each transmitter adapts its
power level. This choice depends on the quality of the channel
between the transmitter and the receiver, the power levels
chosen by the other transmitter and the energy remaining. The
set of transmitters is denoted by K = {1, . . . ,K} and for each
transmitter k ∈ K, the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) writes
γk(p1, . . . , pK) =
pk |hk|
2
Ik + σ2
, (1)
where pk ∈ Pk and |hk|2 are the power level and the channel
gain of transmitter k, respectively. The variance of the noise
is represented by σ2. The interference term is denoted by
Ik =
1
N
∑
j∈K,j 6=k pj|hj |
2 with N a processing gain due
to interference management at the receiver. For example, in
CDMA systems, N represents the spreading factor.
The instantaneous energy-efficiency, in bit/joule is defined
as
uk(p1, . . . , pK) =
Rf (γk(p1, . . . , pK))
pk
[bit/J], (2)
where R is a constant rate of the transmitter. The function f
is the probability of having no outage which takes its values
in [0, 1] and depends on the SINR.
Two parameters define the state of each transmitter: the
channel coefficients to the receiver and the remaining energy
in its battery. The evolution of these parameters is modeled
by the two following laws. The channel evolution law is
dhk(t) =
1
2
(
µ− hk(t)
)
dt+ ηdWk(t), (3)
where µ ∈ C and η ∈ R are constants related to the
channel statistics and Wk(t) are mutually independent Wiener
processes. Depending on the value of η, this law can model
slow-fading or fast-fading. Additional properties about the
asymptotic behavior of the channels are given in [13].
The evolution law of the remaining energy in the battery is
given by
dEk(t) = −pk(t)dt. (4)
This means that the energy of the battery decreases with the
transmit power consumption.
III. FROM THE STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAME
FORMULATION TO THE MEAN FIELD GAME
A. Stochastic Differential Game
With the model defined in the previous section, the problem
of each transmitter maximizing its expected energy-efficiency
over a given time interval can be addressed with an SDG. Time
is assumed to be continuous, i.e., t ∈ R. The time horizon of
the game is finite, it is the interval ranging from T to T ′.
Definition 1 (SDG model of the power control problem):
The stochastic differential power control game is defined by
the 5−tuple
G = (K, {Pk}k∈K, {Xk}k∈K, {Sk}k∈K, {Uk}k∈K) where:
• K = {1, . . . ,K} is the set of players. Here, the players
correspond to the transmitters.
• Pk is the set of actions of player k ∈ K. Here, the action
set corresponds to the interval of transmit power values.
• Xk is the state space of player k ∈ K. The game state
for player k ∈ K at time t is defined by Xk(t) =
[Ek(t), hk(t)]
⊺
.
• Sk is the set of feedback control policies for player k ∈
K. A control policy will be denoted by pk(T → T ′)
which is a function of time between T and T ′ two reals
such that T ′ ≥ T ;
• the average utility function Uk is defined by:
Uk
(
p(T → T ′)
)
= E
[∫
T
′
T
uk(p(t),X(t))dt+ q(X(T ′))
]
,
(5)
where p(T → T ′) =
(
p1(T → T
′), . . . , pK(T → T
′)
)
is
the control strategy profile, X(t) = [X1(t), . . . , XK(t)]
is the state profile, q(X(T ′)) is the utility at the final
state, and uk is the instantaneous utility.
Even if it can be proven that a Nash equilibrium exists in this
game under given conditions [13], obtaining the expression
of an equilibrium requires to solve a system of 2K coupled
equations. Consequently, the complexity of such a system
makes its resolution impossible for K large. This makes us
consider the MFG associated with the problem to overcome
this complexity issue.
B. The Mean field game analysis (K → +∞)
1) Assumptions: When the number of players goes to
infinity, under the assumption of the exchangeability of the
players of the game and the convergence of the interference
term, the SDG can be proven to converge to an MFG. The
exchangeability property (see [13] for more details) is ensured
if each player only knows its individual state and implements
an homogeneous admissible control: pk(t) = α(t,Xk(t)). A
sufficient condition for the convergence of the interference
term is limK,N→∞ KN = θ > 0. In this new game, the set
of players is continuous and the generic state of a player is
given by s(t) = [E(t), h(t)]⊺, whose distribution is given by
mt (mt is the mean field). The SINR can be rewritten as:
γ̂(s(t),mt) =
p(t)|h(t)|2
σ2 + Î(t,mt)
, (6)
with Î(t,mt) the interference resulting from the continuum of
other players
Î(t,mt) =
∫
s
|h|2α(t, s)mt(ds), (7)
where α(t, s) denotes the generic power response at time t
and state s. The instantaneous utility writes
û(p(t), s(t),mt) =
Rf(γ̂(s(t),mt))
p(t)
. (8)
The main advantage of the MFG formulation is that the
utility of each player depends only on its own state s(t) and
a common mean field mt.
2) Solution to the mean field best-response problem: For
the mean field optimal trajectory m∗t , the best-response of the
generic player is such that there exists an average utility:
v̂T = sup
p(T→T ′)
E
[∫ T ′
T
û(p(t), s(t),m∗t )dt+ q(s(T ′))
]
. (9)
Conversely, the control policy resulting from (9) has to lead
to the distribution trajectory m∗t . Consequently, a solution of
the mean field response problem is a solution of the system
∂v̂t
∂t
+ H˜(s(t),
∂v̂t
∂E
,mt)
+
1
2
〈µ− h,∇hv̂t〉R2 +
η2
2
∆hv̂t = 0,
∂mt
∂t
+
∂
∂E
(mt
∂
∂u′
H˜(s(t),
∂v̂t
∂E
,mt))
+divh(mt
1
2
(µ− h)) =
η2
2
∆hmt,
(10)
with v̂T ′ = q(s(T ′)), mT known and
H˜(s, u′,m) = sup
p
{û(p, s,m)− p.u′}. (11)
The first equation is a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming
equation which gives the behavior of v̂t for a given mt. It
is coupled with a Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation which
gives the behavior of mt for a given v̂t. The former one
is a backward equation whereas the latter one is a forward
equation. It means that an initial condition for mt and a
final condition for v̂t are needed to solve the system of two
equations.
C. Two particular regimes of the mean field game
Solving (10) in the general case is complicated since the
state of a transmitter includes both its energy and its channel
coefficients. However, it is possible to study the solutions of
the mean field response problem for these two parts separately.
1) Large energy budgets: If energy budgets are large
enough, the variation of energy during the game can be
neglected. Consequently, only channel coefficients can be
considered as the state of the transmitter. In this case, the
mean field problem reduces to{
∂v̂t
∂t
+ supp û(p, h,mt) = 0,
∂mt
∂t
+ divh(mt
1
2 (µ− h)) =
η2
2 ∆hmt.
(12)
The first equation amounts to choosing the Nash equilibrium
from [6] as the power control. The second equation only
depends on the channels statistics and give the evolution of the
distribution of the channels. The second equation is solved first
and the solution mt is inserted in the first equation to obtain
the power control.
2) Quasi-static channels: Considering only energy as the
state of a transmitter amounts to assume that the channel
coefficients are constant during the time interval [T, T ′]. In
this case, the mean field problem turns into{
∂v̂t
∂t
+ supp{û(p,mt)− p
∂v̂t
∂E
} = 0,
∂mt
∂t
− ∂
∂E
(mtp
∗) = 0,
(13)
with p∗ = arg supp{û(p,mt)−p∂v̂t∂E }. The first equation gives
v̂t and p∗(T → T ′) given mt. The second equation gives mt
given p∗(T → T ′). Equilibrium power control policy resulting
from this case is illustrated in the following section.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR A QUASI-STATIC CHANNELS
In this section, we provide illustrative numerical results
for the particular case of quasi-static channels, i.e., when the
energy dynamics are faster than the channel dynamics. For
the implementation of the proposed scheme, each terminal
requires only the knowledge of its own channel state and
energy level to choose the transmit power.
A. Comparison with other NE
For the purpose of evaluating our results, we compare the
equilibrium of the MFG to the equilibrium of two other well
known games.
1) The static Nash: This is the classical NE from the work
of [6]. The equilibrium point is given by the equation:
∀k ∈ K, p∗k =
σ2
|hk|
2
β∗
1− θβ∗
(14)
where β∗ is the unique solution of the equation
xf ′(x)− f(x) = 0. (15)
2) The repeated game ”operating point”: When the power
control game is treated as a discounted repeated game,
there are several NE. In [12], the authors propose an
equilibrium point, defined as the “operating point” which
can be very close to the global optimal point. This
equilibrium is given by the equation:
∀k ∈ K, p˜k =
σ2
|hk|
2
β˜
1− θβ˜
(16)
where β˜ is the unique solution of the equation
x
(
1− θx
)
f ′(x)− f(x) = 0. (17)
B. Parameters used
For the purpose of simulations, in order to obtain useful
numerical results we take the following parameters:
1) the rate R = 1 Mbps,
2) the noise level with path loss, σ2 = 0.1 W,
3) the channel gain E|h(t)|2 = 1,
4) the success function f(γ) = exp(− 0.9
γ
) [2].
The averaged channel gain for all players at all times is taken
to be a constant E|h(t)|2 = 1. The initial distribution in
energy of the terminals mT is specified for each figure. The
final condition vˆT ′ = q(s(T ′)) is set to 0, in order for the
Fig. No T ′ − T mt(E, t = 0) Plotting
1 20 1 P ∗ v.s (t, E)
2 20 1 P ∗ v.s t
3 20 1 mt v.s (t, E)
4 20 0 if E ≤ 18, else 1 mt v.s (t, E)
5 120 1 P ∗ v.s t
6 120 1 vt(E, t = 0) v.s E
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR THE PRESENTED FIGURES.
comparison to be fair with equilibrium power policies from the
static game and the repeated discounted game. Indeed, there
is no final reward in these two games. We take the maximum
available energy to be Emax = 20 J and time duration T ′−T
is specified for each figure.
C. Discussion
On Fig. 1, the equilibrium power policy plot shows that
terminals starting the game with high energy level (20 J in the
figure) start transmitting with a high power level. Then this
power decreases with time. It can also be noted that terminals
starting the game with low energy do not transmit at high
power values at the beginning of the game. They first wait for
other terminals to empty their battery in order to suffer from
less interference. This phenomenon is highlighted on Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1. MFG equilibrium power policy w.r.t. time and energy.
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Fig. 2. MFG equilibrium power policies w.r.t. time for 3 initial amounts of
energy, for a short game duration.
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Fig. 3. Evolution of the energy distribution with the equilibrium power policy
of the MFG for uniform initial distribution.
On Fig. 3, where terminals start the game with a uniform
energy distribution, it can be seen that the amount of terminals
with high energy (20 J) decreases with time, whereas an
increasing proportion of terminals have empty batteries. A
similar behavior is captured on Fig. 4, except that there are
only terminals with high energy at the beginning of this case.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the energy distribution with the equilibrium power policy
of the MFG for non-uniform initial distribution.
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Fig. 5. MFG equilibrium power policies w.r.t. time for 3 initial amounts of
energy, for a long game duration.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the average energy-efficient utilities with the MFG
equilibrium power policy, for a long game duration, against the equilibrium
from the static game, and the operating point from the repeated game
formulation defined earlier.
Since the solution to the mean field response problem is
determined for a given time duration, the equilibrium power
control policy naturally depends on this duration. Hence, it
is interesting to increase the time duration, as it is done on
Fig. 5, to capture the impact on the power policy. Globally,
it entices the terminals to consume less power to make their
batteries last longer. This low consumption gives the terminals
a better energy-efficiency than with the equilibrium form the
static game or the equilibrium from the discounted repeated
game, as illustrated on Fig. 6.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we treat the problem of power control games
as a mean field game, taking into account the limited energy
available to mobile transmitters, and the effects of channel
fading. Provided that convergence conditions are met, the
mean field approach offers interesting and useful results. While
in the general case, the resulting partial differential equations
are hard to solve, we analyze some special cases where
numerical results can be obtained. The numerical results are
encouraging, but they have only been computed for the case
of quasi-static channels.
Some of our key results that can be interesting to engineers
and other researchers are presented below:
1) Terminals with a low starting energy transmit with lower
power at the start and slowly increase their power with
time, when the energy distribution is homogeneous and
T ′ − T small.
2) In the same case, terminals with a high starting energy
start with a high power and slowly decrease their power
with time.
3) Terminals with a low starting energy transmit with lower
power at the start and slowly decrease their power with
time and then raise, when the energy distribution is
homogeneous and T ′ − T large.
4) The equilibrium of the mean field game when T ′ − T
is large, outperforms other known equilibrium (from [6]
and [12]) in terms of energy-efficiency.
A numerical solution to the general case of an evolving
channel as well as the energy constraint, is a possibility for
future work. Additional possibilities include considering a
multi-cellular network, distributed base stations and the multi-
carrier case.
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